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Siggins: Drug Manufacturers' Liability

COMMENT

STRICT LIABILITY FOR PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS: WHICH SHALL GOVERNCOMMENT K OR STRICT LIABILITY
APPLICABLE TO ORDINARY PRODUCTS?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1963, California adopted Justice Traynor's theory of
strict liability for products. l One year later, the Restatement followed his lead with the addition of section 402A which imposes
liability upon manufacturers for selling defective products in
conditions that are unreasonably dangerous. 2 To establish strict
liability, under section 402A, a plaintiff must prove that a product was defective when it left a defendant's control and that the
defect caused injury to a reasonably foreseeable user.3 It is this
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963). Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Traynor expressed the court's
belief that manufacturers should be strictly liable in tort for articles which they place in
the market, knowing the articles will not be further inspected, and possibly cause injury
to human beings. Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § ,402A (1964) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT § 402A).
3. Id. In the Restatement § 402A, the defect requirement is expressed as follows:
(1) One who sells any products in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused ... if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product and (b) it is expected to and does reach the
user or consumer without substantial change in the condition
.
in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although (a)
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product and (b) the user or consumer has not
bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
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defect' requirement that distinguishes strict products liability
from other forms of strict liability.1I
Because of the far-reaching consequences of strict products
liability, the Restatement authors added comments a through q
to qualify, explain, and sometimes restrict the application of section 402A.6 Comment k is restrictive; it modifies the application
of strict liability if unavoidably unsafe products are involved. 7
Using the vaccine for rabies as an example, the authors of the
Restatement explained how some products are so beneficial to
society that the risk of using the product is superseded by its
need. s Specifically recognizing prescription drugs as such prodId.

4. Defective, according to comment g, is a condition, not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. Id. at comment g. This is
commonly referred to as the consumer-expectation test. California courts have established that the defect can take one of three forms: a manufacturing flaw, a design defect,
or an inadequate warning.
5. See Comment, The Failure to Warn Defect: Strict Liability of the Prescription
Drug Manufacturer in California, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 743, 749 n.37 (1983).
6. See 38 American Law Institute (A.L.I.) Proc. 19, 90-98 (1961). During the discussion of § 402A, A.L.I. member, Harold Gross, offered an amendment to exclude prescription medicines as a class from the section's scope. He warned that including such products under strict liability would be "against the public interest" due to the "very serious
tendency to stifle medical research and testing that would result." Id. at 91. Dean Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement, replied that he was very concerned about this
problem and that he had struggled unsuccessfully to solve it in drafting the text. He
recommended that rather than including it in the text, these special problems posed by
such medicines should be dealt with in the comments accompanying § 402A. The A.L.I.
agreed. Id. at 94.
7. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. Comment k provides that a
product will not be considered unreasonably dangerous if it is properly prepared, accompanied by proper directions and warnings; also, a seller will not be held to strict liability
as a result of injury in those circumstances. Id. However, if the product is not prepared
properly, a manufacturer will be held to strict liability. Id. The same is true with warnings and directions; they must be appropriate under the circumstances. Id. The law calls
it strict liability but the reasonableness aspect requires a negligence analysis. Id.
8. Id. Comment k states:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in
the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for
the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death,
both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high degree of risk
which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defec-
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ucts, the authors of the Restatement recognized that a product's
makers should not be subjected to strict liability if a product is
properly manufactured and accompanied by proper directions
and appropriate warnings. s Unless there is something wrong
with such a product, apart from its unavoidable hazards, it will
not be defective according to the standards of section 402A.lO
The California appellate courts have traditionally treated
prescription drugs as the primary group governed by comment
k." Although the California Supreme Court has not directly
dealt with this issue, the court has recently acknowledged that it
is looking for a case in which to consider the application'of orditive, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for
this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or
under the prescription of a physician .... The seller of such
products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where
the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because
he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. (Emphasis added.)
ld.
9. ld. Manufacturers of unavoidably unsafe products may incur strict liability only
if there is a manufacturing flaw or an inadequate warning. Comment k, therefore, employs a combination of strict liability principles and negligence principles. The unavoidably unsafe product can not be deemed defective solely because it fails to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect it to when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. ld.
10. See PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser pointed out that
there must be something wrong with a product to make it unreasonably dangerous to
those who come in contact with it. He noted that an ordinary pair of shoes was not
unreasonably dangerous just because the soles became slippery when wet; nor was a
hammer unreasonably dangerous because one might smash a thumb. Likewise, knives
and axes must be able to cut in order to be useful. [d. at 659.
11. In several decisions, California's courts of appeal have discussed comment k in a
manner that indicates the court believes comment k should apply to all prescription
drugs. See McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 86-87, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730,736
(1978) (comment k "implicitly recognizes the social policy behind the development of
new pharmaceutical preparations"); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 987-91, 95
Cal. Rptr. 381, 398-402 (1971) (quoting and applying comment k); Toole v. RichardsonMerrill, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 708-11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 412-14 (1967) (quoting and
applying comment k); Christofferson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 15 Cal. App. 3d 75,
79-80, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971) (citing comment k with approval); Grinnell v.
Charles Pfizer & Company, 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 435 n.7, 79 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 n.7
(1969) (citing comment k in dictum and stating that when "products, such as drugs,
which are unavoidably unsafe ... [are) properly prepared and accompanied by proper
directions and warning, [they are) neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous").
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nary strict products liability principles to prescription drugs,
rather than section 402A and its comments. 12 Furthermore,
Chief Justice Rose Bird has stated that she believes the standard generally applied in strict liability cases should also be applied to drug manufacturers. l3
This change would be troublesome. For over two decades
the California appellate courts have consistently allowed comment k to govern prescription drugs. If the court should decide
to apply the strict liability standard for ordinary products instead of the strict liability standard for unavoidably unsafe
products, it will refute its own reasoning that precedent should
determine the standard for defectiveness in the products liability field;a the purpose of comment k would be defeated. lIi
This Comment will review the history of strict products liability and the policies which have shaped its development. It will
examine the state of the law today regarding strict liability for
harm caused by prescription drugs, and demonstrate that comment k should continue to govern prescription drugs. Furthermore, it will point out that sound reasoning and public policy
dictate that the modified strict products liability of comment k,
rather than ordinary strict products liability, is the appropriate
theory to establish liability for prescription drugs; it is also the
method most beneficial to society's needs. Finally, this Comment
12. Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 694, 677 P.2d 1147, 1148, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 870, 871 (1984). In the opinion, Justice Richardson stated:
Although we granted hearing in this case to consider the application of strict liability principles to injurious side effects
allegedly produced by prescription drugs, our review of the
record has convinced us that in light of the basis upon which
plaintiff tried his case, this broader issue is not properly
before us.
[d.
13. [d. at 720, 677 P.2d at 1166, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 889 (Bird, J., dissenting).

14. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 417, 573 P.2d 443, 446, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1978). In Barker, the court emphasized that "the defectiveness concept defies a simple, uniform definition applicable to all sectors of the diverse product
liability domain." [d. The Barker court further explained that the question of what defect concept was appropriate could "best be resolved by resort to the 'cluster of useful
precedents' which have been developed in the product liability field in the past decade
and a half." [d. at 428,573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235 (quoting Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134 n.16, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442
n.16 (1972)).
15. See supra note 7. To apply the same test to determine liability for prescription
drugs and ordinary products would defeat the purpose of comment k.
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will predict how the California Supreme Court will apply comment k to prescription drugs when the court is faced with the
appropriate case.
II. STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A.

AN

1.

Development of a Cause of Action

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Strict liability was first advocated as a basis of recovery for
injuries related to defective products by former Justice Traynor
in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling CO.16 In Escola, the plaintiff, a
waitress, was injured when a soda bottle broke in her hand as
she carefully moved it from the case to the refrigerator. 17 The
defendant bottler used pressure to bottle carbonated beverages
and had exclusive control over both the charging and the inspection of the bottle. ls Although it was not clear whether the explosion had been caused by an excessive charge or a defect in the
glass, the court felt that neither problem would have ordinarily
been present if the bottler had used due care. 19 A majority of the
court held that negligence could be inferred based upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 20
Justice Traynor, in a concurring opmIOn, asserted that a
manufacturer's negligence should not provide the only basis for
a plaintiff's right to recover.21 According to Justice Traynor, a
manufacturer should be liable for any injury caused by a defect
in a product which the manufacturer placed on the market
knowing it would be used without further inspection. 22 This type
of liability would discourage manufacturers from marketing de16. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
17. [d. at 456, 150 P.2d at 437.
18. [d. at 459, 150 P.2d at 439.
19. [d. at 461, 150 P.2d at 441.

20. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided: (1) the
character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief
that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which
caused the injury is shown to have been under the exclusive management of the alleged
wrongdoer. The rule may not apply when direct evidence of negligence exists. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
21. Escola at 461, 150 P.2d at 440.
22. [d.
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fective products that cause injury.23
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,24 the California
Supreme Court adopted Justice Traynor's position and held that
the cost of injuries from defective products should be borne by
the manufacturers of such products. 2Ci In Greenman, the plaintiff's wife bought, from a retailer, a power tool made by the defendant. 26 While using the tool as a lathe, the plaintiff was injured when a piece of wood he was shaping flew up and hit him
in the face. 27 At trial, experts testified that the lathe was defective in design; the set screws were inadequate to hold certain
adjustments. The harm could have been prevented by a different
design. 26 Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, reaffirmed his concurrence in Escola. 29 Manufacturers should be
strictly liable for defective products which cause injury when
such manufacturers place these articles on the market knowing
they will be used without further inspection. 30
One year after Greenman, section 402A was added to the
Restatement. Section 402A defines defective products as those
products that cause injury due to a condition not contemplated
by the ultimate consumer.31 The Restatement provides that a
product will not be unreasonably dangerous if it is accompanied
by appropriate directions or warning ;32 the duty to warn is determined by the seller's knowledge. 33 Although the language of
the Restatement seemed clear, the authors34 went a step further
[d. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441.
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
[d. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
[d. at 59, 377 P.2d at 898, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
[d.
28. [d. at 60, 377 P.2d at 899, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 699.
29. [d. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
30. [d.
31. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment g.
32. According to the Restatement, in order to prevent a product from being unreasonably dangerous, it may be necessary for a seller to give directions or provide warnings
on a product's container. [d. at comment j.
33. [d. A seller is required to give a warning if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight, should have knowledge of the
risk. [d.
34. Roger J. Traynor, then Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court and the
principal architect of California's product liability system, was one of the official advisors
to the Restatement and was extremely concerned about this particular application of
strict liability.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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to ensure against the likelihood of liability for unavoidable injuries from drugs which are beneficial to society.311 This emphasis
demonstrated the authors' intent.
In less than a decade later, Cronin u. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,36
rejected the Restatement's definition of defective for ordinary
products; the defect no longer had to be unreasonably dangerous. Instead, the court decided that a plaintiff need only prove
there was a defect in the product, and that the defect was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 37 In Cronin, the driver
of a nine year old bakery truck was forced off the road as he
tried to pass another vehicle. 88 The impact broke the safety hasp
that held bread trays, thereby freeing the trays.89 The trays then
fell forward, struck the plaintiff in the head, and knocked him
through the front windshield.· o The plaintiff alleged that the
hasp was defective. n The defendant appealed from a judgment
for the plaintiff on the ground that the trial judge omitted the
requirement that a defect must be "unreasonably dangerous. ".2
According to the court, the unreasonably dangerous qualification was not in the original formulation of strict liability set
forth in Greenman, but had its origin in the Restatement.· 8 The
Cronin court cited a number of cases to explain or support the
general products liability rules articulated." Significantly, none
of those cases involved a prescription drug or any other unavoidably unsafe product. u Precedent, in the field of products liability law, was treating ordinary products and unavoidably unsafe
products differently. The Restatement's definition of defect for
unavoidably unsafe products was not rejected.
35. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k. Comment k provides that
unless an unavoidably unsafe product, such as a prescription drug, is improperly prepared or not accompanied by appropriate directions or warnings, it is not defective;
therefore, the product's manufacturer will not be held strictly liable. [d.
36. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
37. [d. at 132-34, 501 P.2d at 1161-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 441-43.
38. [d. at 121, 501 P.2d at 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
39. [d.
40. [d.
41. [d.

42. [d. at 128-29, 501 P.2d at 1158-59, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.
43. [d.
44. [d. at 130-33, 501 P.2d at 1160-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 440-43.
45. [d.
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Defect Defined

Although Cronin had established that, in order for a product to be defective, it need not be unreasonably dangerous, it
was unclear what constituted a defect!6 However, that issue was
clarified in Barker v. Lull Engineering Company, Inc:" The
Barker court established that there are at least two kinds of defects: manufacturing defects and design defects!8 Manufacturing defects exist in products that are not as a manufacturer intended them to be, or which differ from other supposedly
identical products of the same product line!9 Design defects are
determined according to Barker's two-prong test. 60 First, a product may be found defective in design if a plaintiff can show that
a product does not function as safely as an ordinary consumer
would expect it to function while using it for its intended or reasonably intended purpose. 61 Second, as an alternate test, a product may be found defective in design if a plaintiff can show that
a product's design was the proximate cause of his or her injuries. 62 Once a plaintiff proves that a product was the proximate
cause of his or her injuries, a defendant must establish that the
benefits of the design outweigh the inherent risks. 63 If, through
hindsight, a court determines that the risk of danger inherent in
a challenged design outweighs the benefits of the design, the
product is defective. 64
Barker examined the issues of products liability as they applied to a forklift. The plaintiff was injured when a high-lift
loader he was operating overturned. 66 To support the court's application of the two-prong test in determining design defect, the
Barker court cited approximately thirty cases; none of the cases
involved an unavoidably unsafe product. 66 Barker established a

47.
48.
49.
50.

8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433.
20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
[d. at 426-30, 573 P.2d at 452-55, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234-38.
[d. at 429, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236.
[d. at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 413, 573 P.2d at 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
[d. Significantly. the caurt noted that the term defect was misleading because it

46. Cranill,

was not defined. [d. at 428, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235. According to the
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definition for defects in design and manufacturing only. Unavoidably unsafe products were presumably covered by comment k.&7
The third form of defect, inadequate warning, was not discussed in Cronin or Barker. In Barker, the court did not decide
the warning issue because the issue was not properly before the
court.&8 However, both before and after Barker, the standard for
determining the adequacy or need for warning has been comment j to the Restatement; the duty to warn arises if a manufacturer knows or should have known of a dangerous condition. &9
The California Supreme Court has not addressed the warning issue, but the California appellate courts have continued to
apply the Restatement in failure to warn cases. 80 Christofferson
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,81 a leading drug injury case, was
decided under section 402A.82 In Christofferson, the plaintiff
suffered permanent visual impairment as a result of ingesting a
prescription drug to treat a skin condition. 8s The court decided
that, because the harmful side effect was not known at the time
of the injury, the manufacturer was not strictly liable. 8 • The Restatement and its comments were again affirmed as a basis for
determining warning defect in Carmichael v. Reitz. 8'" The appellate court approved the trial court's jury instructions pertaining
to the strict liability of a drug manufacturer for failure to warn
of a risk inherent in a drug; the instructions were based on the
court, it was easier to apply a definition of defect to manufacturing defects. Id. The court
further noted that products likely to be injurious in their normal condition, would need a
more specific definition of defect. Id. at 427, 573 P.2d 453·54, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235-36.
57. Id. at 413, 573 P.2d at 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
58. Id. at 420 n.l, 573 P.2d at 449 n.l, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229 n.!.
59. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment j. The Restatement standard of
strict liability for failure to warn was explained in Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153,
104 Cal. Rptr. 433. Comment j was first used as the test of defectiveness for failure to
warn in Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965). In
Cavers v. Cushman, 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979), a case following
Barker, the court noted that Cronin did not alter the standard for defectiveness due to
an inadequate warning. Id. at 343, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
60. See Comment, supra note 5, at 746-47.
61. 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 92 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1971).
62.ld.
63.ld.
64.ld.
65. 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
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Restatement and its comments. 66
The California Supreme Court recently had an opportunity
to determine the duty of a pharmaceutical manufacturer to warn
of potential side effects of prescription drugs. 67 In Finn v. G.D.
Searle & Company, the court instructed the jury that a manufacturer of a prescription drug was liable to a plaintiff if the
manufacturer failed to warn the medical profession within a reasonable time after he or she knew of potentially harmful side
effects.68 The court further instructed the jury that a manufacturer was under a duty of due care to warn the medical profession of potential dangers even if the percentage of users who
might be harmed was minor.69 The duty, however, did not extend beyond warning the medical profession; the drug manufacturer had no duty to warn the patient. 70 To be adequate, a warning must be reasonable under the circumstances. 71 The standard
of strict liability for failure to warn used in defective product
cases, and in defective drug cases, remained the standard set
forth in the Restatement and its comments.
III. PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS AND STRICT LIABILITY
Under present California law, the unavoidably unsafe product doctrine of section 402A of the Restatement governs all
pharmaceutical medicines. 72 Recently, however, in Finn v. G.D.
Searle & Company, the California Supreme Court expressed an
interest in reviewing strict products liability as applied to prescription drugs. 73 The court noted that failure-to-warn cases in
66. Id. at 987, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 398. In Carmichael, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of the drug Enovid which was prescribed to the plaintiff by her physician to help
her become pregnant. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that an inadequate warning by the
drug manufacturer caused her to suffer blood clots in her lung and her leg. Id.
67. 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1984).
68. Id. at 697-98, 677 P.2d at 1150-51, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 873-74.
69.Id.
70.Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 11.
73. 35 Cal. 3d at 694, 677 P.2d at 1149, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (1984). In Finn, the
trial court rejected the plaintiff's proposed instruction for a manufacturer's duty to warn.
The modified instruction provided, in part, that a drug manufacturer is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care to warn of potential dangers reasonably foreseeable from the use
of the manufacturer's drug. The plaintiff argued that, by modifying the proposed instruction, the trial court introduced negligence principles which impaired the plaintiff's
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California have been subject to a distinct form of analysis regarding strict liability.7. Some California courts have held that
concepts of negligence are absorbed by the doctrine of strict liability; other courts have decided that although the rules expressed in comment j are referred to as strict liability rules, they
are merely well settled rules of negligence. 711
A California trial court recently ruled on the applicable
strict liability law in DES litigation. 76 The court stated that because Finn had not provided suitable precedent to decide the
issues, it would look to other authority for their resolution. The
court relied upon those cases that deal with the application of
strict liability to prescription drugs and which have accepted the
Restatement's section 402A and comments j and k. 77 The court
further determined that the design defect standards of Barker
are not applicable to prescription drugs. 78
strict liability claim. The California Supreme Court noted, however, that these assertions
were founded upon the proposition that there is a significant difference between negligence claims and strict liability claims due to failure to warn. The court pointed out that
if one determined liability for failure to warn of defects discovered after a product
caused injury (i.e., a Barker hindsight analysis) there would be a substantial distinction
between a negligence standard and strict liability. Id.
74. Id. at 699, 677 P.2d at 1151, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
75. Id. at 700, 677 P.2d at 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The court noted that both
common sense and experience dictate that it would be impractical to impose a need to
warn based on every piece of information in a manufacturer's possession. According to
the court, to overwarn is to reduce the effectiveness of all warnings. Id.
76. DES is the abbreviation for Diethylstilbestrol, an estrogen preparation that was
prescribed to prevent miscarriages. See infra note 77. In re DES Litigation, No. 830-109
(Cai. Super. Ct., San Francisco, Aug. 16, 1985) (General Order No. 11) (petition for writ
pending hearing of April 21, 1986) [hereinafter cited as In re DES Litigation). With the
concurrence of all parties to the DES litigation, common issues were submitted to the
Complex DES Litigation Judge, after briefing and argument, for decisions that would
have common application to the DES cases before the court. Id.
77. In re DES Litigation, at 5. After analysis of those cases and the Restatement,
the court concluded:
there is substantial legal authority in [California) adopting
comments j and k standards in strict liability litigation involving ethical drugs and their potentially injurious side effect. Diethylstilbestrol, prescribed for the purpose of treatment of
threatened and habitual miscarriage, is a prescription drug
and falls within the ambit of comments j and k.
Id.
78. Id. Initially, the court maintained that the product would fail to meet the
threshold requirement of the first prong of Barker or the "consumer-expectation" test
because it was not a product within the common experience of ordinary consumers. Id.
at 11-12. The court pointed out that such a product was made according to a scientific
formula and prescribed according to a physician's judgment. Id. Likewise, the court ex-
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The California Appellate Court recently affirmed its position on strict liability and unavoidably unsafe products in Kearl
u. Lederle Laboratories. 79 The Kearl court ruled that although
unavoidably unsafe products, like all other products, are subject
to strict liability for manufacturing defects, they are not subject
to strict liability for design or warning defects.so The court noted
that even though defective warning in products liability cases
may be a basis for strict liability, the appropriate analysis is
based on negligence. S1
In Kearl, a child developed paralysis about four weeks after
receiving an oral polio vaccine. S2 The child's parents alleged that
the drug was defective due to design and warning and asserted a
strict products liability theory at trial,83 The trial court allowed
strict products liability design defect testimony, and instructed
the jury on the Barker theory of design defect. s• Although the
child's mother had read and signed a warning noting the risk of
contracting polio from the vaccine, she alleged that the warning
was inadequate; she contended that the warning failed to inform
her that oral polio vaccine was "the best way to get polio
today."slI
On appeal by the drug manufacturer, the court found that
the trial court erred in allowing the child's parents to present a
strict products liability design defect case. According to the
court, the lower court should have first determined whether or
not the product was unavoidably unsafe, and therefore, exempt
plained that the second Barker test, the risk-benefit analysis, was equally inappropriate
because the object of that test is to determine if the risk of danger inherent in the design
outweighs the benefit of that design. [d. at 12. Such a test was premised primarily on the
likelihood of a different design posing less risk. The court pointed out that in most prescription drugs there is no alternate design available. [d. The court further argued that
to adopt either of the tests set forth in Barker would require abandoning the policy
considerations of comments j and k which have become a part of the strict liability law
of California and that the court had neither the inclination nor authority to do so. [d. at
12-13. The court concluded, therefore, that since there was no allegation of a manufacturing or production defect in the DES cases, strict liability will apply only when a defect is based on a failure to warn. [d. at 13.
79. 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
80. [d. at 817, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
81. [d. at 832, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
82. [d. at 820, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
83. [d.
84. [d.

85. [d. at 834, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
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from strict product design liability.ss The court noted that for
over two decades courts have decided that some special products
should not be subjected to a strict liability design defect analysis; those products are often prescription drugs. s7 Furthermore,
the court contended that a Barker standard for determining design defect may result in a delay of marketing products because
of further testing. ss The court pointed out that these considerations suggested that special unavoidably unsafe products tip the
scales away from holding a manufacturer strictly liable so as to
ensure a product's availability.ss
The Kearl court required a determination as to whether a
product, including a drug, is to be viewed as unavoidably unsafe. so These special products should not be judged in light of
ordinary consumer expectations or present scientific knowledge;
they should be reviewed according to a manufacturer's actual or
constructive knowledge at the time of marketing. s1 Consistently,
for over two decades, the courts have concluded that these products, including prescription drugs, should be exempt from the
normal strict products liability design defect analysis. sz

IV. A BARKER ANALYSIS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS

A.

PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS ARE UNIQUE

Barker determined that a product is defective in design if it
fails one of two alternate tests. SS First, if the product does not
function as an ordinary consumer would expect when the con86. [d. at 836, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 468. The court also ruled that the warning was, as a
matter of law, adequate under the circumstances.
87. [d.
88. [d. at 823-24, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 458-59. The court conceded that whereas this

delay may be beneficial to society as far as general products were concerned, in the case
of some special products, such as prescription drugs, a delay in marketing may prolong
suffering or deny a needed cure. [d. at 823, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459. Furthermore, the court
stated, increased production costs, which will stem from increased insurance costs as well
as from extended testing, can conceivably cause manufacturers to withdraw or decline to
develop certain products. [d. at 824, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
89. [d. at 824-25, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
90. [d. at 829, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64.
91. [d. at 825, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
92. [d. See also supra note 11.
93. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 462, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 244 (1978).
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sumer uses the product in a reasonably foreseeable manner, or
second, if a plaintiff can show, from a hindsight perspective, that
the product's design was the proximate cause of injury and that
the risks inherent in the design outweigh its benefits. 94
A prescription drug is not designed. Drugs are produced according to a formula, the component parts of which combine to
create the desired results. 911 The inclusion of each component is
necessary to produce the formula. 96 To change the formula is to
produce a different drug. Therefore, liability based on the premise that an alternate design would have avoided the harm
caused by the drug used is not applicable to prescription drugs.
As set forth in the Restatement, drugs were never intended to be
found defective in design under a strict liability standard, only
under a negligence standard. 97
Under strict liability, a manufacturer can be held liable simply for manufacturing a product; this is because liability is based
on unforeseeable risks as well as foreseeable risks. Because drugs
are chemical compounds, they contain components that may adversely affect certain individuals. 96 As Dean Prosser observed:
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products should make good the
harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add
the cost to the price of the product, encounters
reason for pause, when we consider that two of
the greatest medical boons to the human race,
penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous side effects, and that drug companies might
well have been deterred from producing and selling them. BB

Comment k cites prescription drugs and vaccines as examples of products that are unavoidably unsafe, and therefore, are
not unreasonably dangerous as long as they are properly manu94. [d.

95. Amicus Brief (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association) for Appellant, Kearl
v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985).
96. [d. at 41-42.
97. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k.
98. See Amicus Brief, supra note 95.
99. See PROSSER, supra note 10.
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factured and a proper warning given. loo To apply the consumerexpectation text to an unavoidably unsafe product, such as a
prescription drug, is illogical. A prescription drug is a chemical
compound; the very chemical formula that produces a desired
result is the same formula that causes the unwanted side effect.
Liability for a manufacturer's inability to alter unique chemical
compounds should not be premised upon a consumer's expectation that an unwanted but unpreventable side effect will not
occur.
The consumer-expectation test requires that a product perform as an ordinary consumer would expect under reasonable
circumstances. 10l Prescription drugs are only available to an ordinary consumer by prescription written by a physician; a physician should determine a consumer's expectations. A physician
decides when a medicine and when and if certain warnings
should be given. Once a manufacturer has warned a physician of
any known risks, a manufacturer's control over consumer-expectation has ended. To hold a manufacturer liable for a consumer's
independently conceived expectations would be unreasonable.
An example, used by the authors of comment k, as to why it
would be illogical and unjust to hold manufacturers liable for
unavoidable harmful side effects is demonstrated by the rabies
vaccine. l02 As was observed in comment k, a person who has
been exposed to rabies has two choices: he can decline to take
the vaccine treatment, thereby risking the occurrence of a disease which invariably leads to a dreadful death, or he can take
the treatment which may cause serious consequences. loa A patient and his physician are in the best position to make that decision. If the courts held a drug manufacturer liable for all resultant injuries, they would interfere with the treatment for rabies.
The second prong of Barker states that products are defective if the benefits from their design do not outweigh the risks. lo•
Comment k, likewise, requires a balancing; a plaintiff has the
100. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k.
101. Id. at comment g.
102. Id. at comment k.
103. Id.
104. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978).
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option to show that an unreasonable risk was present when he
used a product. 1011 A significant difference between the risk-benefit analysis of comment k and Barker is that Barker determined
the risk according to hindsight. l06 If at the time of trial it is
known that the risks of using a product outweigh the benefits,
the product is determined defective. Comment k, however, expressly rules out hindsight liability even as to new or experimental drugs for which unforeseen side effects are always a possibility. It merely provides that knowledge, by a manufacturer, at
production time should justify the marketing and use of a
drug. l07 A hindsight analysis of risk would deter research and
production of experimental drugs. l08
The comment k requirement also differs from Barker procedurally. Once a plaintiff establishes that a product's design proximately caused his injury, Barker places upon a manufacturer of
ordinary products the burden of establishing that the benefits of
a product's design outweigh its risks.loe Barker's threshold requirement that a plaintiff prove that a design, as opposed to a
product, proximately caused his injury/lo contemplates that the
product could have been designed in some other fashion. When
a product is unavoidably unsafe, by definition, it cannot be
designed differently.
Additionally, the Barker court shifted the burden of proof
to a manufacturer because evidence relevant to determining
risks and benefits, such as the cost of an alternate design, involve technical matters often within the knowledge of a manufacturer.111 However, the question of an alternate design is not
at issue in an unavoidably unsafe product. Therefore, the only
question remaining, determining risks and benefits, involves empirical evidence compiled not only by manufacturers but by the
Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control,
and other entities that conduct such studies. 112 This information
RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k.
Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225.
RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k.
See supra note 88.
Barker, 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225.
110. [d. at 426-27, 573 P.2d at 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
111. [d. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
112. See Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 41-42.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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is readily available to product liability plaintiffs. 1l3 The riskbenefit analysis that precedes approval of any prescription drug
is sufficient; it does not warrant the imposition of an additional
burden of proof upon manufacturers.1l4
B.

PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG SHORTAGES DUE TO FEAR
OF LIABILITY

Application of a Barker analysis to prescription drugs will
have a negative effect upon the supply of necessary pharmaceutical drugs. m If drug companies are held liable for unforeseeable
or unavoidable injuries, the fear of such liability can extend testing of new drugs and delay marketing. Further, manufacturers
of unavoidably unsafe drugs may cancel drug production because of the fear of liability.
Illustrative of the negative effect strict liability will have
upon drug manufacturers is the case of the swine flu vaccine
shortage. lI6 In 1976, President Gerald Ford announced plans to
conduct a national vaccination program against a newly discovered influenza virus, the swine flu.1l7 A swine flu vaccine was
ready for production, but fear of liability by drug manufacturers
caused insurance companies to deny liability coverage to manufacturers of the vaccine.1l8 Consequently, manufacturers were
unwilling to supply the vaccine. lIB Production of the vaccine
proceeded only after Congress passed legislation naming the
United States as the defendant in any action by recipients of the
vaccine. 120
Recently, a major drug company stopped production of
diptheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine because of the
"extreme liability exposure, cost of litigation and the difficulty
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra note 88.
116. See Franklin & Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons
from the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 754 (1977).
117. Id. Scientists had warned this was necessary to avoid a devastating epidemic.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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of continuing to obtain adequate insurance."121 Subsequently,
another major drug company acted similarly.122 The company
informed the federal government's Centers for Disease Control
that, due to the unwillingness of its liability carriers to renew
coverage of DPT vaccine sales, the company would be unable to
respond to new requests to supply the vaccine to state and local
health departments. 123 One vaccine manufacturer remained in
the market and announced it would attempt to make up the resulting shortage of vaccine. l24 However, this manufacturer experienced production problems which prompted the Director of
the Centers for Disease Control to advise Congress that, unless
drastic measures were taken, there would be shortages of DPT
in the early months of 1985 in many areas of the country.12I!
At a house committee hearing, a physician, speaking on behalf of the American Academy of Pediatrics, suggested that instead of spreading the cost of a very limited risk, expanded liability would greatly increase the risk to the public. u6 After
noting that high liability awards had driven several vaccine producers out of the market and that remaining producers had significantly increased prices, the physician expressed concern that
either an insufficient supply or cost of the DPT vaccine would
make the vaccine unobtainable to a large segment of the population. 127 He placed the blame on "the deteriorating liability situation" and noted that the tort process has not served us well. 128
Additionally, he asserted that many vaccines are still needed
even though the diseases are rare; if parents stopped immunizing their children, the diseases would reappear. 129
For example, oral polio vaccine has been deemed an effective method for preventing polio in the vast majority of those
who use it.130 Without the vaccine, there would be many victims
121. Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
122 (1984).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol16/iss2/2

18

Siggins: Drug Manufacturers' Liability

1986]

DRUG MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY

327

of this disease. However, the very nature of the live vaccine
means that on rare occasions, and without any way of predicting,
some unfortunate recipients contract the disease from the
vaccine. 131
C.

ApPLICATION OF COMMENT K

Comment k does not grant pharmaceutical manufacturers
immunity from strict product liability rules. 132 On the contrary,
these manufacturers may be held strictly liable for any medicine
that they improperly prepare; improper preparation is considered a manufacturing defect.1s3 Furthermore, drug manufacturers may be liable for inadequate warnings. Comment k mandates
that the medicine in question must present only a "reasonable
risk" to the public; the benefits from its use must outweigh the
attendant risks. 13• However, manufacturers under comment k
are required to provide warnings against even unavoidable risks
although the user can do nothing to reduce those risks. 13G Additionally, a pharmaceutical manufacturer must provide warnings
against preventable dangers. 13s Warnings must be given by the
person most capable of making a decision regarding the risk to
any given individual-the physician who will prescribe the
drug. 137
Comment k imposes a modified strict liability standard
which is more properly adapted to unavoidably unsafe products.
Manufacturers of these products may incur strict liability for
manufacturing defects or inadequate warnings. However, manufacturers may not incur strict liability solely because they fail
the consumer-expectation test nor may they be subject to a design defect analysis; unavoidable hazards are not deemed
defects.
Comment k is largely premised upon public policy.13s The
131. Id.
132. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 697, 677 P.2d 1147, 1153, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 870, 876 (1984).
137. Id.
138. See supra note 6.
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authors of comment k were concerned with the population's
health. They did not want drug research and manufacturing to
be infringed upon due to fear of liability!39 Comment k was tailored by experts to fit the body of pharmaceutical medicines as
well as other unavoidably unsafe products. The system has worn
well for over twenty years. Society's need for development of
new drugs has, if anything, increased. There is no need to alter
the design.
D.

PREDICTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the fact that the California appellate courts have
traditionally applied comment k to determine liability for prescription drugs, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court of
California will abandon that standard in favor of a Barker analysis. The policy reasons which underlie comment k will weigh
heavily in the decision-making process. As has been shown,
there is considerable data to support the fear that drug research
and manufacturing will be severely handicapped with a broader
application of liability. Additionally, the often expressed desire
of the authors of comment k that manufacturers not become insurers of their products1'o is a persuasive reason to continue
comment k protection for prescription drugs.
According to the Finn decision, the court is unwilling to reject the reasonableness language of the Restatement as a standard for determining strict liability for failure to warn in drug
injury cases. 141 The Finn court also asserted that this was not
the appropriate case to consider the broader issue of "application of strict liability principles to injurious side effects allegedly
produced by prescription drugs."H2 Therefore, in light of the
Finn decision, it is unlikely that the court will reject comment k
in favor of a Barker analysis.
It is more likely that the court will grant some protection to
certain drugs such as vaccines which either prevent a disease or
reduce the spread of a disease among a significant number of
139. [d.
140. RESTATEMENT § 402A, supra note 2, at comment k.
141. Finn. 35 Cal. 3d 691. 677 P.2d 1147. 200 Cal. Rptr. 870.
142. [d.
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individuals. These drugs will continue to receive comment k protection. In order for a drug manufacturer to be held strictly liable, a plaintiff must show either a manufacturing flaw or an inadequate warning. The remaining unavoidably unsafe products
or prescription drugs will be subject to a standard of liability to
be determined on a case-by-case basis; those drugs must be determined to be unavoidably unsafe and beneficial enough to outweigh the risks involved with their use.
Concededly, this method of determining liability is not
without fault. Initially, there is the question of who shall make
the determination, judge or jury? Either alternative presents
further litigation problems to an already overloaded judicial system. However, the problem can be avoided if the California Supreme Court will acknowledge that which has long been established in the appellate courts-comment k should govern
liability for prescription drugs.
A compelling proposal is for the government to indemnify
those individuals who are injured as a result of vaccination programs. Not only are these programs beneficial, they are often
mandatory. This, however, is a legislative matter, not a judicial
matter.
V.

CONCLUSION

The unavoidably unsafe product doctrine of comment k was
intended to apply to all strict products liability cases involving
pharmaceutical medicines. It has served, thus far, as the basis
for establishing liability in the California courts and should continue to do so. Additionally, imposition of strict products liability is likely to result in a shortage or elimination of needed
drugs.
Furthermore, certain aspects of the strict products liability
standard governing ordinary products are not applicable to
pharmaceutical medicines. For instance, drugs are unique products. They are chemical compounds with characteristics inherent
to their very nature. These characteristics occasionally cause
problems. However, a change in the compound would alter the
effectiveness of the drug.
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Finally, comment k does not immunize manufacturers from
strict products liability. Rather, it imposes a modified strict liability standard which is more properly adapted to unavoidably
unsafe pharmaceutical drugs. The troublesome result of strict liability would be a heavy price to pay for compensation of those
unfortunately injured as a result of lifesaving drugs.
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